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Abstract
Illegal immigration aﬀects not only EU member states at the Mediterranean Sea but also
more Northern states due to open internal borders and onward migration. Northern member
states may free-ride on border countries’ enforcement eﬀorts, leading to a sub-optimal level
of border control. While neither a centralized nor a coordinated policy appears to be feasible,
we show that employing an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference rev-
elation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios. This policy
measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator
between member states, which at the same time must accept the Commission to play this role.
Key Words: illegal migration, immigration policy, border enforcement, interregional transfers,
European Union, expected externality mechanism
JEL Codes: F22, J61, J68.
∗Department of Economics, University of Paderborn, Germany. Email: Claus-Jochen.Haake@notes.upb.de.
Phone: +49-5251-60-3378.
†Department of Economics, University of Paderborn, Germany. Email: tim.krieger@notes.upb.de. Phone: +49-
5251-60-2117. Fax: +49-5251-60-5005.
‡Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Paderborn, Germany. Email:
sminter@notes.upb.de. Phone: +49-5251-60-2120. Fax: +49-5251-60-5005.The European Council asks the Council and the Commission to work out
arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external
border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism
or common services to control external borders could be created.
(From: Presidency conclusions of the European
Council meeting in Laeken, 2001 (bold added).)
1 Introduction
Illegal immigration is a matter of major concern in the political and public debate in many EU
member states. In particular, countries along the Mediterranean border like Italy, Spain and Malta
have experienced numerous attempts of migrants and refugees to illegally enter these countries.
Despite substantial eﬀorts to keep borders closed, large inﬂows can be observed. The illegal immi-
gration ﬂows towards the Mediterranean countries may also aﬀect other EU member states, due
to the openness of internal borders in the Schengen area which enables illegal immigrants to move
on to more Northern states. In fact, recent evidence from Italy shows that a reasonable share of
illegal immigrants coming to this country is actually planning to head for Germany or France as
their ﬁnal destination (Chiuri et al., 2007).
Under these circumstances, public spending on the enforcement of external borders in Southern
EU member states may be characterized as a public good. This is because each Euro spent on
enforcing the borders in these countries reduces inﬂows to more Northern member states, even
if they do not contribute to enforcement spending, i.e. EU member states at the Mediterranean
Sea impose a strong positive externality on the rest of the EU. In fact, Wolﬀ (2008) observes
that countries without (relevant) external borders, such as Germany, Austria or Sweden, seem to
be rather reluctant to contribute to ﬁnancing border controls in the South, possibly because they
cannot be excluded from the beneﬁts from enforcement eﬀorts in Spain, Italy or other places. Hence,
they ‘free-ride’ on these eﬀorts or on any contributions made by some other non-Mediterranean
member state which (for whatever reason) truthfully states its willingness to pay.
From an economic perspective positive externalities or public goods typically lead to a sub-
optimally low level of border enforcement because countries at the external border do not take
into account the positive eﬀects on other EU member states when deciding about enforcement
spending. In the most extreme case, the equilibrium outcome of this game between member states
is such that border countries may be left completely alone with the burden of enforcement. More
likely, however, is a scenario in which the Northern member states contribute at a level well be-
low the level that corresponds to their true preferences with respect to immigration policy. This
problem was one of the main reasons for the European Commission to propose the concept of
1integrated border management in 2002 which aims at establishing (among other things) a ﬁnan-
cial burden-sharing mechanism between all member states based on the idea of ‘solidarity’ (Jorry,
2007). However, few advances in this ﬁeld can be observed so far. Still in 2006, for instance, the
Maltese president Adami claimed in an address to the European Parliament that“Europe urgently
needs an immigration policy that can deliver a response that oﬀers Europe’s trademark solidarity
with [...] the countries of ﬁrst arrival in Europe that are unable to deal with this problem on their
own.”
In order to solve the underlying public good problem, traditional economic theory suggests either to
delegate political decision-making on this issue to the next higher government level or to harmonize
policy. An eﬃcient provision of a public good requires a supranational governing body to be fully
informed about the beneﬁts and costs of the individual countries (or the entire Union) and to be
able to enforce the welfare-optimal policy, e.g. by levying taxes. Otherwise, as Samuelson (1954)
puts it, “it is in the selﬁsh interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less
interest in a given collective activity than he really has,” i.e. countries have a strong incentive to
free-ride (at least to some degree which does not violate the idea of solidarity too obviously) on
other countries’ actions. Harmonizing policy, on the other hand, appears in fact to be even more
diﬃcult as it requires unanimous decisions of all member states.
From an institutional perspective, the EU was never given the possibility to act as a powerful
supranational governing body with respect to border management policy in the past as this issue
was never among the exclusive competences of the EU, but had to be agreed upon (unanimously) in
the EU Council. Hence, the supranational EU body did neither have full information nor coercive
power.1 At the same time, policy coordination between member states or within the EU Council is
a diﬃcult task. Even under the French EU Presidency, which pushed on the topic quite strongly,
no substantial advances could be achieved. So far, joint initiatives are rare. For instance, the
common EU agency Frontex was founded in 2005 to coordinate EU-wide eﬀorts in the enforcement
of the external borders but suﬀers from low enthusiasm of its participating members, especially
in operations involving maritime patrols (European Commission, 2008). The important Nautilus
initiative, for instance, which targeted illegal migration across the central Mediterranean Sea to
Malta and Lampedusa faced a substantial lack of contributions from member countries (Lutterbeck,
2008). Not only the problem of under-supply of public goods shows up quite clearly in this case,
but also the strategic interests of some member state to underreport their interest in the joint
measure (and thus their willingness to pay). While a Northern member state may in fact be
1This relates to issues covered under Articles 62–64 TEC (now Articles 77–79 TFEU), i.e. ‘border controls,
asylum and immigration’. The border agancy Frontex is formally an exception to this rule, as it is legally designed
as an “EC ﬁrst pillar institution”. However, the tasks undertaken are not legally deﬁned and member states are not
under legal obligation to collaborate (Carrera 2007).
2harmed substantially by illegal immigration if borders were open, in order to free-ride on other
countries’ enforcement eﬀorts it may decide to indicate a low interest in border enforcement. Since
other member states can hardly estimate the negative eﬀect of illegal immigration on a country
without external border, an information problem arises.
Things will change slightly under the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, TFEU) which treats border enforcement
policies as ‘shared competencies’ to which the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ applies. Decisions will
be taken by the qualiﬁed majority in the Council (55% of the EU member states representing 65%
of EU’s population) in ‘codecision’ with the European Parliament. While this rule should enhance
eﬃciency of the decision making process, it is doubtful that this will solve the problems generated
by the public good character of border enforcement. This is because the information problem is not
solved through simply changing the legislative procedure. Despite the newly introduced possibility
for the EU to develop its own actions and policies, the ‘double majority’ requirement is an important
restriction. In order to achieve the necessary majority, the EU (as well as the potential beneﬁciaries
among the member states) has to bid for support by the larger Northern member states, which
allows the latter to behave strategically (e.g. by underreporting their interests). However, the
right of initiative for the EU has the advantage that the EU may play a more active role in
this ﬁeld, thereby possibly acting as a moderator in designing an enforcement mechanism. More
speciﬁcally, the EU could become active within the ‘open method of coordination in immigration’
(OMC Immigration), which is a soft law framework trying to improve voluntary coordination under
the moderation of the EU institutions (Caviedes, 2004).
If neither a social-planner solution at a supranational level nor a policy coordination or harmo-
nization in the Council appears to be feasible, one has to consider alternative institutional settings
that may help introducing a welfare-maximizing solution on a voluntary basis. In this framework,
the EU may in fact act as a moderator (rather than active player), introducing a mechanism in
which all member states truthfully state their preferences for external border enforcement. In an
economist’s terminology, a mechanism is “an institution with rules governing the procedure for
making a collective choice” (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 866). More speciﬁcally, although countries’
preferences are not public information and thereby unobservable for any other country and the
central EU authority, a mechanism sets incentives for all countries to act in a way that the burdens
from external border enforcement are shared in accordance with national preferences, while imple-
menting the socially optimal enforcement level. The aim of this article is to investigate whether a
speciﬁc mechanism is able to fulﬁll this goal.
The economic literature on mechanism design has suggested a number of mechanisms for imple-
menting the optimal level of a public good. One of the best known is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), which imposes compensating (side) pay-
ments and transfers on each single actor depending on actors’ announced preferences. These pay-
3ments induce the actors to reveal their true preferences, irrespective of what all other agents
announce. A similar, yet extended, proposal is the scheme going back to the works of Arrow (1979)
and d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) which is also known as the expected externality mech-
anism. It allows to consider asymmetrically informed actors, who form expectations about their
counterparts’ characteristics. Contrary to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism the expected ex-
ternality mechanism rests on a more demanding assumption that the actors have to take the others’
actions into account. The concept of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is used, meaning that stating
the true preference is optimal, whenever all opponents do so. Hence, telling the truth may not be
a dominant strategy, but at least it forms a (Bayes-)Nash equilibrium.
Not only does the expected externality mechanism allow for easier implementation of a welfare-
optimal mechanism, it also resembles the situation in the EU more closely. This is because the
decision about border enforcement in the EU is likely to be one of incomplete information and
of interdependent decision-making. We therefore base our following analysis on this mechanism
and choose the following setting: We consider an economic union in which illegal migrants enter a
member country situated at the external border. Fellow member countries, located distant from the
external border, are only aﬀected by onward migration, i.e. illegal immigrants moving on from the
Southern border country to a more Northern interior country. The problem of incomplete informa-
tion relates to the assumption that countries have diﬀerent preferences on illegal immigration and
governments can only form an expectation about the true preferences in the fellow member states.
Member states’ preferences on illegal migration are shaped by its negative impacts on economy
and society, but also possible gains from employing illegal immigrants in a shadow sector of the
economy or from extracting some sales tax revenues etc.
Our results are somewhat encouraging with respect to possbile outcomes of introducing a mech-
anism, but nevertheless suﬀer from a substantial drawback. Acknowledging that our model is a
strong simpliﬁcation of the real-world situation, we can show that the expected externality mecha-
nism leads to an eﬃcient level of enforcement at the EU’s external borders, solves the information
problem of the central authority, i.e. the EU Commission, and also balances the budget by use
of side payments. In this sense, we are able to explain and justify the EU’s role as a moderator
(rather than being an active legislator) in a policy ﬁeld of truely European dimension, given that
the EU accepts and adopts this role (whether it does, is certainly an open debate from today’s
perspective). On the other hand, the mechanism does not guarantee voluntary participation of all
involved countries. In fact, by applying a simple numerical example we show that the participation
constraint is fulﬁlled only in some cases, mainly when the border country is relatively small and
rates of onward migration are relatively high. Interestingly, it is the border country – which at the
outset suﬀered most from uncoordinated behaviour – which may prefer to stay outside the volun-
tary agreement described by the mechanism in the remaining cases. The reason for this ﬁnding
4is that – for a given burden sharing rule – the eﬀect of illegal immigration must be suﬃciently
negative to interior states to induce suﬃciently large transfer payments to the border countries.2
The main lesson from our exercise may be summarized as follows: Voluntary policy coordination
between EU member states on issues involving a public-good problem is diﬃcult to achieve. The
EU acting as a moderator imposing an eﬃciency-enhancing preference revelation mechanism may
appear as a promising alternative to attempts of policy coordination under unanimity rule or the
ordinary legislative procedure. However, our proposed solution fails to guarantee voluntary par-
ticipation of all member states under some speciﬁcations. The problem of voluntary participation
in the mechanism also highlights the impossibility of introducing a social-planner solution, which
in theory leads to an optimal outcome. Shifting the entire responsibility for European border en-
forcement to the EU level will not be supported by all EU member states, but requires unanimous
agreement between all members. In sum, even from a theoretical perspective (and more so, from a
practical point of view) there does not appear to be a simple solution for improving policy outcomes
in this ﬁeld. Mechanism design may nevertheless be a promising way of approaching this topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple model of a federa-
tion, which is prone to illegal immigration. We derive the welfare maximizing level of enforcement
eﬀorts in Section 3, and demonstrate that a decentrally chosen level diverges from the social opti-
mum in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce the expected externality mechanism and describe how
it can be applied in the ﬁeld of border management. Additionally, we give a numerical example
of the mechanism to clarify its incentive structure in Section 6. Here we consider two diﬀerent
scenarios, which diﬀer in the characteristic of the border country. The last section discusses the
results and gives some policy implications. Note that we abstain from presenting technical details
in the main parts of the paper; the appendix contains a full technical speciﬁcation of the model.
2 A simple model of a federation with illegal immigration
In this section, we introduce a basic model of a federation – such as the European Union – which
is prone to illegal immigration. In order to keep the formal apparatus manageable, we restrict the
model to include three member countries only. One of these countries, called the border country,
is located at the fringe of the federation. In terms of today’s situation in the EU, we may think
of Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy, Malta or Greece, which are well-known to be
targets of substantial illegal immigration. The two other countries, called interior countries, have
no (relevant) external border with the rest of the world; consider, e.g., Germany or Austria. Border
2Note that the term ‘transfer’ refers to net payments through some fund which is the typical procedure to
redistribute resources between member states of the EU.
5country and interior countries are located next to each other and separated only by a legal border
which is not enforced, reﬂecting the situation in the Schengen area. Passing this borderline presents
no relevant obstacle to the movement of people including illegal immigrants.3 Because the federation
as a whole has a relatively high wage level and living standard compared to the rest of the world,
we expect a steady inﬂow of illegal immigrants into the federation.
Furthermore, we assume that – as in today’s EU – there is no common and comprehensive immi-
gration policy in the federation at the outset. Each member state chooses restricting immigration
according to national cost-beneﬁt considerations and preferences for immigration, thereby ignoring
the eﬀects of national immigration policy on other member states. As we assume that there are
always attempts to illegally enter the country, there is a high migration pressure which exceeds
the maximum legal limit set by any national legislation. In order to keep our analysis as simple as
possible, we further assume that illegal immigrants have ﬁrst to arrive in the border country before
they can eventually move on to an interior country. We call the latter behaviour onward migration.
Any eﬀort to curb illegal immigration must therefore be conducted by the border country, possibly
supported by other member states through monetary transfers.
The number of illegal immigrants, M, in the federation depends positively on the exogenously given
migration pressure on the federation (M) and negatively on the total eﬀort in border enforcement
along the external border (E), such that enforcement reduces the illegal inﬂow. Those illegal im-
migrants slipping through the border controls may move onward to the interior countries. This
behavior results in illegal immigrants spreading over all countries. Obviously, the number of illegal
immigrants in the border country (M1) is the diﬀerence between all illegal immigrants that arrived
in the federation (M) and those that moved on to the interior countries (M2 = αM, M3 = βM))
for given rates of onward migration (α, β).
The well-being of the citizens in a single country i is represented by a quasi-linear utility function.4
This type of utility function has some nice properties simplifying our analysis; in particular, it
increases the number of implementable mechanisms (Maskin and Sj¨ ostr¨ om, 2001) and thus oﬀers a
broader range of welfare-optimal allocations which may be applied to our federal framework. The
aggregate utility in country i, Ui, is described by the following function:
Ui = yi − Hi − ci + mi + xi,
where yi is output, Hi is a valuation function reﬂecting the costs of illegal immigration, ci is the
3In an alternative setting, Krieger and Minter (2007) and Mayr et al. (2009) investigate a scenario in which illegal
immigrants, after entering the country and because of fear of detection, wait until they are legalized before they
move to another member state.
4This type of utility function implies that a country’s willingness to pay for the public good is unaﬀected by
its social product or total tax revenues net of the contribution to ﬁnancing the public good. This appears to be a
reasonable assumption in this context as necessary enforcement spending is probably negligible relative to GDP.
6cost share of ﬁnancing border enforcement, mi is the initial endowment of money and xi is a side
payment paid to (or received from) some other country.
Positive utility is derived from private consumption which is paid out of social product yi. Here, we
assume a simple production process generating yi which is the same in each country and uses legal
(L) and illegal labor (M) as factors of production (yi = F(Li,Mi)). Illegal immigrants concentrate
in the underground economy, which is nevertheless complementary to the regular labor market.
Countries diﬀer in their endowment of legal labor.
Illegal immigration results in a (net) disutility, denoted by a (negative) valuation function Hi.
This function summarizes all beneﬁts and costs of illegal immigration to society which go beyond
the mere production process. Negative eﬀects may arise, for instance, from the impact of illegal
immigration on the social stability in the country. Illegal immigrants are often perceived as having
a higher probability of getting involved in crimes as victims or as fellons compared to natives and
legal migrants (Epstein and Weiss, 2001). There may also be a problematic inﬂuence on the moral
standards in a country. A high number of illegal immigrants tends to increase the shadow economy
and may thus lower moral barriers for other people to get involved in clandestine activity.5 On
the other hand, positive eﬀects of illegal immigration are documented as well, for example, when
it comes to social cohesion. In many countries, home care can only be sustained with support of
illegal immigrants who are clandestinely employed to look for elderly and sick people (Welt, 2009).
This positive eﬀect goes beyond the mere inﬂuence on the production of the consumption good via
releasing natives from their caring duties. Furthermore, at least in countries granting citizenship
based on ius soli the immigrants’ children become legal citizens and will eventually contribute to
the social systems.6 This names just a few of several – positive as well as negative – eﬀects from
illegal immigration which may be relevant.
When modelling the expected externality mechanism the valuation function plays an important
role because countries may have diﬀerent preferences over illegal immigration. For instance, the
negative eﬀect through the valuation function may be especially pronounced if the positive eﬀect
through home care is low or the shadow economy is considered as particularly problematic. While
a country’s government can – by and large – assess its citizens’ preferences, these preferences
are hardly observable for the fellow member countries. It is therefore a reasonable assumption to
account for the possibility of incomplete information among member states. In addition, we make
the simplifying assumption that incomplete information matters mainly for interior countries, but
not the border country. This is justiﬁed by the fact that border countries often have a long tradition
5Particularly relevant for the european countries appears to be the inﬂuence on the welfare state. Algan and Cahuc
(2006) named the public spiritedness of citizens as an important feature of the eﬃciency of welfare instruments.
This public spiritedness might be negatively inﬂuenced by illegal immigration.
6Sinn (2001) shows that a child generates a positive externality of e90.000 to the German society.
7of dealing with illegal immigration, such that information can be deduced from the country’s past
behavior. In order to keep our approach technically tractable, we also assume that there are only
two ‘preference’ levels that the two interior countries may take on, namely that countries have a
high or low valuation of the negative (net) eﬀect of illegal immigration. Both interior countries have
the possibility to misreport their true preferences, which is not an option for the border country.
Finally, the direct costs of enforcement, ci, depend on the total eﬀort devoted to controlling the
border. These costs include wages for border guards and expenditures on building and maintaining
the infrastructure. The endowment mi is needed to provide necessary resources in the economy.
Side payments xi will be discussed only later in Section 5 when the expected externality mechanism
is introduced; until then side payments do not play a role.
3 Socially optimal border enforcement
In the previous sections, we identiﬁed positive externalities (on which the public good problem rest)
between member states of the federation to be the reason for the ineﬃcient level of external border
enforcement. Obviously, these spillover eﬀects are fully internalized when assuming a perfectly
informed and benevolent central government, e.g. a powerful EU governing body, taking decisions
for (and gathering information from) the entire federation. All cost and beneﬁt considerations are
taken into account in the central government’s decision; strategic misreporting by single member
states is excluded under these circumstances. Hence, we are able to characterize the optimal policy
on border enforcement by treating the federation as one large country (with three sub-central units
and a well-informed central government). Deﬁning the welfare of the federation as the sum of the
utilities of the three single countries, i.e. U = U1 + U2 + U3, we can derive the welfare maximizing
level of enforcement. In the course of our analysis, this optimal level will serve as a benchmark
scenario to which all other outcomes have to be compared.
In the appendix, we present the full optimization problem of a central government. In the following
proposition, we restrict ourselves to a non-technical characterization of the optimality conditions.
Proposition 1 A fully informed benevolent central government achieves a welfare optimal level
of enforcement by balancing the marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts of enforcement in its entire
territory, consisting of all three member states of the federation.
Border enforcement tends to reduce the number of illegal immigrants which generates both positive
and negative eﬀects to the federation. The positive eﬀect is the reduction of the negative impact
of immigrants indicated by the valuation function.7 The marginal costs of border enforcement are
7Here, we implicitly assume an interior solution of the optimization problem.
8twofold. On the hand, enforcement reduces the supply of the production factor ‘illegal labor’ and
has therefore a negative impact on the production side. On the other hand, there is an increase
of the direct costs of enforcement through additional border guards and facilities etc. Note also
that the marginal beneﬁt of enforcement is decreasing with the total eﬀort on enforcement. A
benevolent central government chooses the level of enforcement up to that point where marginal
beneﬁts equal the marginal costs, i.e. when an additional Euro spent on enforcement generates a
beneﬁt (in monetary terms) of equal size.
4 The outcomes of decentralized decision-making
In this section we analyze the decision over enforcement when there does not exist a central gov-
ernment and all decision-making takes place at the national level. A priori no coordination between
member states of the federation is assumed. This scenario resembles the situation within the EU
before either negotiating a possible policy coordination or introducing some preference revelation
mechanism. We expect an under-supply problem to arise because when deciding on the level of
external border enforcement, the border country (which in our framework is the only country to
directly decide on enforcement spending) does not take into account the negative eﬀects of onward
migration of illegal immigrants for the interior countries. Since spending on border enforcement
reduces illegal immigration and thus onward migration, it generates a positive externality. We
summarize and evaluate this idea in the following proposition. Again, we provide a non-technical
speciﬁcation and relegate the formal derivation to the appendix.
Proposition 2 Assuming that all countries in the federation decide alone and uncoordinately on
immigration policy, the border country then chooses a level of external border enforcement such that
its own marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs balance in equilibrium, thereby ignoring any eﬀcts on
fellow member states. Compared to the social optimum, the level of enforcement diverges, depending
on the preferences in the interior countries and the cost sharing rule.
The proposition shows that decentrally chosen enforcement spending fails to provide the optimal
level of enforcement. The total direct costs of enforcement are borne by the border country only.
While some beneﬁts accrue to the border country, other countries may beneﬁt as well. However,
beneﬁts accruing to other countries do not enter the border country’s decision because no com-
pensation is taking place. Therefore, it is optimal from a national perspective to equate national
marginal beneﬁts and costs only. From a national perspective costs appear relatively high compared
to beneﬁts such that a too low level of enforcement is chosen, given that additional beneﬁts are
9enjoyed by other countries (but ignored by the border country) due to reduced onward migration.8
Any payments related to onward migration and enforcement by the interior countries will change
the optimization problem of the border country. If low levels of onward migration result in transfer
payments from an interior to the border country, the border country will consider the eﬀect of
onward migration in its decision on enforcement spending. Now tightening costly border controls
will increase national beneﬁts due to the money received and, ceteris paribus, a higher level of
border enforcement will be chosen, thereby possibly approaching the welfare optimal level from the
federation’s perspective. Transfer payments of this type, in the following denoted as side payments,
will play an important role in the discussion of the expected externality mechanism in the next
section.
5 Mechanism design
In section 4 we demonstrated that the decentrally chosen level of enforcement diverges from the
welfare maximizing level. This result leads us to search for a policy option which ensures the
welfare maximizing level derived in section 3, even when preferences are private information of
the individual countries. Hence, the crucial question is whether we can design an institution, or
mechanism, in which the individual countries have an incentive to truthfully report their valuation
of the public good ‘border enforcement’. Before answering this question by applying the expected
externality mechanism numerically in section 6, we provide some background information on this
technique here.9
Broadly speaking, a (direct) revelation mechanism provides incentives for the actors – in this case
the governments of the member countries – to truthfully report their preferences. Based on this
information a central authority may be able to implement a welfare maximizing policy. There
are several conceivable mechanisms that have been dealt with in the literature, for an overview
see Jha (1998). The underlying idea is that the supranational governing body asks all national
governments about their (marginal) willingness to pay for providing a public good. This information
is used to determine (i) the level of public good provision and (ii) each countries’ payments to the
supranational government (or an EU fund, respectively). The mechanism is then set up such that a
single member state has to pay a tax whenever its announced contribution imposes an externality
8Note that our numerical example in section 6 reveals that under some circumstances the argument may turn
upside down, i.e. the decentralized solution may involve higher spending than the outcome under a central govern-
ment.
9For more details on the expected externality mechanism and a general overview on mechansim design see
Maskin and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2001) or Jackson (2001). An intuitive application of mechanism design to the provision of
environmental protection oﬀers Emons (1994).
10on the other countries. Ideally the tax covers precisely the external eﬀect, thereby resembling a
Pigouvian tax. A country’s misreporting of preferences usually causes an externality and is punished
by introducing compensating contributions through the mechanism. Therefore, truthtelling is the
optimal strategy for each country.
For the analysis in this paper we use the expected externality mechanism going back to the
work of Arrow (1979) and d‘Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) which implements truthtelling in
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. This mechanism has some features that make it especially attractive
for an application to immigration policy in the EU. These features are the following:
• The mechanism ensures an eﬃcient provision of the public good, i.e. the level of the public
good maximizes welfare in the federation. More speciﬁcally, the resulting level of border
enforcement maximizes the sum of valuations of all EU member states.
• Contrary to the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism the expected externality
mechanism succeeds in balancing the budget of all side payments, i.e. no outside source
of ﬁnancing is needed nor does the mechanism leave a surplus of money whose redistribution
may bias incentives. Practically, this implies that an EU fund collecting ﬁnancial means for
ﬁnancing border enforcement neither runs a deﬁcit nor a surplus.
• The mechanism ensures Bayesian incentive compatibility. In equilibrium, every country al-
ways reports its true type – even without knowing the other countries’ preferences. No EU
member country chooses to free-ride on other countries’ enforcement spending.
When it comes to applying the expected externality mechanism to European border enforcement
policy, we may describe the mechanism as follows. If the central EU government body (e.g. the EU
commission) wants to implement a regime of coordinated border enforcement, which is ﬁnanced
by equal cost shares of all member countries, the EU government asks the member states for their
willingness (i.e. their preferences) to contribute to border enforcement in a ﬁrst step.10 Since the
preferences are private information each country has an incentive to strategically misreport. A
country with a low valuation of enforcement has an incentive to underreport, a country with a
high valuation tends to overstate its preferences. The mechanism therefore speciﬁes payments and
transfers depending on all countries’ reports to the authority. The central authority then carefully
chooses the structure of payments to the ‘enforcement fund’ based on each country’s report and
the estimated externality (relative to the welfare optimum). Since the rules of the mechanism are
common knowledge and since misreporting ultimately leads to compensating payments, the central
10We implicitly apply a direct mechanism, where actors directly report their preferences to the authority. Other,
more complex institutional arrangements are also conceivable but according to the revelation principle of Dasgupta,
Hammond and Maskin (1979) each of them can be mimicked by a direct mechanism.
11government sets incentives which guarantee that each country truthfully reports its preferences from
the outset. In a second step the authority implements the optimal level of enforcement based on
the countries’ reports (which are truthful, given the ﬁrst step’s incentive structure).
Within the set-up, each country has incomplete information about preferences in the fellow member
countries. For simplicity we assume that each country may prefer only a high or low level of
enforcement. While the preferred level of illegal immigration (or enforcement, respectively) of a
single country is randomly drawn, the probability distribution is common knowledge to all countries
and the central authority. When asked for its preferences each country’s government strives to
maximize the expected utility of its citizens. The payments of the mechanism are speciﬁed as to
internalize the expected externality that this country inﬂicts on all other countries by reporting
its type, or as Emons (1994) puts it: “each agent is essentially paid the expected value of the
other agents’ net surpluses conditional on her own report”. Therefore the mechanism induces each
country to help maximizing joint welfare through its decision what to report, thereby having no
incentive to misreport its preferences. A formal presentation of the mechanism is included in the
appendix.
To demonstrate the expected externality mechanism in the context of EU immigration policy more
clearly we turn to a simple numerical example in the next section.
6 Numerical example
This section contains a numerical example to demonstrate how border policy in the EU can be
coordinated with the expected externality mechanism. The example is based on the 3-country
model introduced in section 2. We assume that one country is situated at the external border
facing migratory pressure from the rest of the world; the other two countries are labeled interior
countries with no external borders. We provide two distinct scenarios which are inspired by recent
real-world observations and which lead to (partly) diﬀerent results.
Our scenarios are derived from the most recent ﬂows of illegal migrants towards the EU via the
‘Central Mediterranean route’.11 According to Fasani (2008) this route, on which immigrants take
oﬀ from North Africa (mostly Libya) and arrive in Italy (mostly on the islands of Lampedusa
and Sicily) or Malta, has recently gained in relative importance.12 For our analysis, it suﬃces to
take account of the stylized fact that destination (i.e. border) countries may diﬀer substantially in
11For a classiﬁcation of the diﬀerent routes see https://www.imap-migration.org/
12Gonzalez-Enriquez (2009) shows that migration streams from Morocco to the mainland of Spain and the Canary
Island have become weaker since the SIVE surveillance system was introduced and a readmission agreement with
Morocco was signed in 2004.
12size. While Malta is a very small country, Italy is among the most populous countries in Europe.
Hence, relative migratory pressure is much stronger in Malta compared to Italy because a small
country can hardly accomodate large numbers of immigrants. Estimates on migration pressure
are naturally imprecise and have to be treated with caution. For example, in 2004 Italy’s Interior
Minister estimated two million potential illegal immigrants waiting for passage in Libya alone.13
Other sources mention up to 18 million potential immigrants.14
Given the relative size of potential destination countries, it is unlikely that illegal migrants consider
a small country such as Malta to be their ﬁnal destination. Hence, a small country may serve only
as a port-of-entry to the EU or as an intermediate stop on the migrants’ way to some other place
in the EU. This will have consequences for the rates of onward migration considered in our model.
Unfortunately the data situation on illegal immigration is dense. Therefore, we have to make some
assumptions here. Note that in the following we label the border country as country 1 and the
interior countries as countries 2 and 3.
First, we make an assumption regarding the size of the intended ﬁnal destination countries (as-
suming that some onward migration will take place). We assume that the two interior countries
are relatively populous but nevertheless diﬀer to some degree. More speciﬁcally, country 2 is about
50% larger than country 3 (this resembles the diﬀerence in active labor force between France and
Germany). Second, we make an assumption about the size of the border country relative to the
interior countries. In scenario 1 (the Malta case), the border country 1 makes up merely 0,2% of
the total working population15 in the federation while interior country 2 accounts for 60% and
interior country 3 for 39,8%. In scenario 2 (the Italian case), all countries are relatively large, i.e.
the border country 1 accounts for 26%, interior country 2 for 45% and interior country 3 for 29% of
the labor force. Third, we assume that the rate of onward migration in scenario 1 is such that 50%
of the illegal immigrants move to interior country 2, 40% to interior country 3 and 10% remain
in border country 1. This reﬂects the fact that illegal immigrants will not stay in a small border
country but prefer to move on. In scenario 2 we assume that only 11% move onward to interior
country 2, 6% move to interior country 3 and 83% stay in border country 1.16
In order to deal with the problem of incomplete information with respect to member states prefer-
ences for border enforcement, we introduce a probability distribution over these preferences which
we assume to be commonly known to all governments at national and supranational level. We
13Source: http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0909/p04s01-woeu.html.
14Source: http://www.zdk.de/salzkoerner/salzkorn.php?id=361&page=1.
15In 2007, Malta had an active working population of only 166.000 persons compared to 41.8 million in Germany.
16These numbers are taken from a survey conducted in 2003 by Chiuri et al. (2007) who asked 920 illegal immi-
grants in Italy for their intended ﬁnal destination (75% named Italy, 10% Germany and 5% France). For Malta no
such information is available.
13keep the distribution as simple as possible by assuming that each ‘type combination’ (high vs. low
preference) occurs with probability 1
4 for interior country 2 and interior country 3. Table 1 visu-
alizes this distribution. Remember that there is complete information about preferences in border
country 1.
t2 = h t2 = l








Table 1: Probability of type combinations in country 2 and 3
For our analysis we ran several speciﬁcations of our model with diﬀering country sizes and rates
of onward migration. While results diﬀer to some degree, our chosen scenarios with a small and
a large border country are by and large representative for our ﬁndings. We will therefore present
only these scenarios to give a ﬂavor of what we can expect in general from our exercise.
6.1 Scenario 1: Small border country
Our ﬁrst scenario demonstrates the mechanism when the border country is small. Next to the
previously stated parameter speciﬁcation, we assume a migration pressure of 5% of the federation’s
labor force which amounts to 3.5 million potential illegal immigrants waiting to enter the EU. In
the appendix we present alternative speciﬁcations with a migratory pressure of 1% and 10%,
respectively. In a ﬁrst step, we now analyze the optimal and decentral choice of enforcement in this
setting and take a look at the payment structure of the mechanism.
Welfare Optimum As demonstrated in section 3 the optimal amount of enforcement spending
from a federal perspective maximizes the sum of utilities in the single countries. Here, the (benev-
olent) central government maximizes the sum of national utilities, i.e. the utility functions of the
small border country 1 and the large interior countries 2 and 3. The optimal level of enforcement
depends on the preferences in each country. Table 2 gives the optimal enforcement levels for the
respective combination of types in interior country 2 and interior country 3.
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h 10.42 5.17
t3 = l 5.97 3.05
Table 2: Welfare maximizing enforcement level for ¯ M = 5
The table may be interpreted as follows. Each cell contains the optimal level of enforcement
given the true preferences for enforcement in each country. For instance, the combination of types
14t2 = t3 = h with a numerical value of 10.42 shows the relatively highest optimal level of enforce-
ment because in both interior countries preferences for enforcement are high, which will be taken
into account in the central government’s optimization problem for the entire federation.17 If the
cost function c(E) is known, from the optimal level of enforcement the monetary cost of optimal
enforcement can be calculated.
Decentral choice of enforcement Next we compare the previously derived welfare optimal
levels of enforcement with the decentralized solution, assuming that there is no central authority
which coordinates the level of enforcement. In this case the border country chooses to enforce the
border according to its national preferences without considering possible eﬀects through onward
migration on other member states. The optimal decentralized choice of the small border country 1
then amounts to
E1 = E = 0.
Here, the public good character of enforcement shows up very clearly. The small border country
is mainly a country of transit for illegal immigrants heading North and therefore chooses not to
enforce the border at all. This is because under a completely decentralized policy regime the country
does not receive any support from their fellow member countries. Hardly surprising the decentrally
choosen level of enforcement diverges substantially from the welfare maximizing level because now
the full (negative) impact of illegal migrants moving onward rests on the interior countries. This
drives down the sum of national utility levels.
Structure of payments Applying the expected externality mechanism under Scenario 1 gen-
erates the (side) payments xi (i = 1,2,3 is a country index for the three countries under con-
sideration) presented in the upper part of Table 3. While a negative sign indicates a payment or
tax which country i has to make to the federation’s enforcement fund, a positive sign represents a
transfer from the fund. Again, we have to distinguish the diﬀerent types of preferences (high vs.
low) for the interior countries. Note that – by construction of the mechanism – all payments and
transfers stated here are based on truthtelling interior countries, i.e. the reported type (high vs.
low preference) is always the true type (please refer to the appendix for technical details).
The numbers indicate that the small border country is in every constellation a receiver of payments,
while the interior countries always have to pay to the enforcement fund. Since payments depend
17Note that in the asymmetric case (with one country having a high and the other country a low preference)
the enforcement level is not the same for the diﬀerent combinations (5.17 vs. 5.97). This is due to the fact that
the countries diﬀer in labor force and in the rates of receiving onward migrants. Therefore the optimal enforcement
level is higher when interior country 2 has a high preference and interior country 2 has a low preference (recall that
country 2 receives more illegal migrants than country 3).
15Payments according to mechanism
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h x1 = 224,9 x2 = −186,5 x3 = −38,3 x1 = 199,5 x2 = −135,8 x3 = −63,7
t3 = l x1 = 220,2 x2 = −191,2 x3 = −28,9 x1 = 194,8 x2 = −140,5 x3 = −54,3
Utility change through participation
t2 = h t2 = l
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
t3 = h −18,4 6220,0 4048,6 6,4 4029,4 3967,0
t3 = l 16,5 6150,3 2269,5 42,5 4028,0 2300,2
Table 3: Payments and Utility diﬀerentials
on the externality caused by each country it follows that border country 1 is compensated for
taking part in enforcement. Without compensation the border country would have abstained from
enforcing its borders. Since in this constellation interior country 2 beneﬁts most from enforcement
it also has to pay most (relative to interior country 3). Note also the diﬀerence in country 2 and 3’s
payments when having diﬀerent types. For both countries payments are higher when reporting a
high preference. Thereby the mechanism internalizes the externality of higher enforcement inﬂicted
on the border country which results from reporting type h.
Although the mechanism internalizes the externalities caused by each country, it does not guar-
antee voluntary participation of all countries. Therefore we have to check participation separately.
Voluntary participation is guaranteed if a country’s utility level under the mechanism exceeds the
(reservation) utility in the status quo which is characterized by the decentral enforcement decision
of the border country. The lower part of Table 3 gives these utility diﬀerentials for each combination
of types and every country. The ﬁrst column gives the numbers for border country 1, the second
and third column the numbers for interior countries 2 and 3, respectively. For the large interior
countries, voluntary participation is always fulﬁlled irrespective of the realized type combination
(i.e. ‘ex-post participation’ is fulﬁlled). For the small border country we ﬁnd that voluntary partici-
pation is fulﬁlled except under the combination t2 = t3 = h. This, however, is not a major problem
as the border country can only maximize the expected beneﬁt due to incomplete information any-
way. Since the expected change in utility under the mechanism is positive for the border country,
voluntary participation is guaranteed (i.e. in jargon ‘ex-interim participation’ is fulﬁlled).18
18Note that according to tables 7 and 9 (included in the appendix) voluntary participation of the small border
country decreases with migratory pressure. While for the case of ¯ M = 1 even the ex-post participation constraint is
fulﬁlled, neither ex-post participation nor interim participation is fulﬁlled in case of ¯ M = 10.
166.2 Scenario 2: Large border country
After having demonstrated the expected externality mechanism for a scenario with a small border
country, we now assume the border country to be relatively large. The border country may now
resemble Italy instead of Malta. The relevant parameter speciﬁcation was stated before at the
beginning of this section.
Welfare Optimum The welfare maximizing levels of enforcement are presented in Table 4.
Compared to Scenario 1 the diﬀerence in the optimal values narrows. This is due to the fact that a
signiﬁcantly larger share of immigrants stays in the border country where enforcement preferences
are given.
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h 6.45 5.80
t3 = l 6.08 5.48
Table 4: Welfare maximizing enforcement level for ¯ M = 5
Decentralized choice of enforcement The decentralized choice of enforcement in the large
border country is characterized by the large share of immigrants staying in this country. In contrast
to the previous scenario with a small border country, it is beneﬁcial for the large border country
to enforce the border even without receiving any support from other countries. The nationally
optimal level of enforcement chosen by large border country 1 amounts to
E1 = E = 6.33
Comparing this number with the welfare maximizing levels in Table 4 we ﬁnd that the level of
enforcement is too low when both interior countries have a high preference for enforcement. In all
other scenarios the decentralized solution is suﬃcient or even higher than in the cooperative case.
At ﬁrst glance this result seems paradoxical, since we expect undersupply of the public good. But we
have to consider that in the cooperative solution each country bears the same share of enforcement
costs irrespective of how many immigrants it really receives. Since the interior countries receive
only few immigrants, the cost sharing procedure is unattractive to them, thereby pulling down the
optimal level from a federal perspective.
Structure of payments The payments under the expected externality mechanism for this sce-
nario are given in the upper part of Table 5. Compared to Scenario 1 the payments diﬀer substan-
tially. While in Scenario 1 the small border country receives all payments, here it is the (large)
17border country which has to pay. The two interior countries are recipients of payments. Intuitively,
large border country 1 which is the main beneﬁciary from enforcement due to the large share of
immigrants has to compensate interior countries 2 and 3 for accepting the establishment of the
EU enforcement fund. Without compensation interior countries would turn out to be net payers
due to high contributions to joint enforcement eﬀorts but little eﬀect on national welfare due to
a low number of illegal immigrants. Therefore the payments internalize the negative externalities
inﬂicted on the interior countries. Note, furthermore, that the transfers beneﬁtting interior coun-
tries 2 and 3 are higher when they have a high rather than a low preference for enforcement. Here
the incentive to understate their preferences and thereby free-ride on the eﬀorts of fellow member
countries is countered through the mechanism.
Payments according to mechanism
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h x1 = −172,2 x2 = 30,5 x3 = 141,7 x1 = −169,9 x2 = 25,8 x3 = 144,1
t3 = l x1 = −171,2 x2 = 31,5 x3 = 139,7 x1 = −168,8 x2 = 26,8 x3 = 142,0
Utility change through participation
t2 = h t2 = l
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
t3 = h −129,3 9,1 120,3 −133,6 11,5 124,5
t3 = l −131,1 10,8 120,7 −139,0 17,0 128,7
Table 5: Payments and Utility diﬀerentials
To analyze the incentive to voluntarily participate we again compute the eﬀect on utility through
participation in the mechanism which is presented in the lower part of Table 5. Here we ﬁnd, that
the large border country has no incentive to participate in the mechanism regardless of the type
combination of the interior countries. This does not come as a surprise as the construction of the
joint enforcement scheme (without the compensating mechanism) is overly generous to the border
country at the expense of the interior countries, while the mechanism avoids this asymmetry. A
national solution is therefore preferred over participating in the mechanism as long as the rate of
onward migration is low19 and the cost-sharing rule is biased in favor of the border country. Under
these circumstances the expected externality mechanism fails to oﬀer suﬃcient incentives for the
border country to voluntarily participate. The deeper reason for this result is the fact that under
the expected externality mechanism each country has to compensate the externalities inﬂicted on
all other countries. In this case, the large border country has to compensate for the high level of
enforcement it desires.
19And countries are relatively equal in size.
18The results diﬀer when the border country is relatively small in size and only few immigrants
stay in this country. Here, the border country receives a transfers according to the mechanism
because it has a relatively low preference for enforcement. The compensation for the high level
of enforcement suﬃces to guarantee the voluntary participation for reasonable levels of migratory
pressure. In general, we may conclude that a weak own-interest of a border country in enforcement
because of a high rate of onward migration increases the likelyhood of voluntary participation of
all member states in joint enforcement measures leading to positive compensating payments to the
border country.
7 Conclusion
Despite years of discussion and rare initiatives the diﬃculties of introducing a comprehensive and
integrated immigration policy in the European Union persist. The results in this paper underline
the complexities of ﬁnding agreements and creating institutions which are supported by all member
countries.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the expected externality mechanism has the capability to con-
tribute to approaching an integrated border management as envisaged by the European Commis-
sion. In an environment of incomplete information about preferences for border enforcement the
mechanism serves to elicit the true preferences of each member state, based on which a welfare
optimal level of enforcement for the entire Union may be determined. This feature makes the mech-
anism especially attractive in light of the reluctancy of non-Mediterranean EU member states to
contribute to enforcing the Mediterranean border. Based on this idea of the mechanism a balanced
EU enforcement fund may be introduced with payments and transfers that internalize possible
externalities. Here, the EU will play the role of a moderator – for instance, within the OMC Im-
migration framework – setting up the mechanism and helping to determine the optimal payment
structure to and from the fund.
Our analysis rests on some assumptions regarding the required information and preference structure
which may be non-trivial to solve. However, any solution in this diﬃcult ﬁeld in European policy will
ultimately suﬀer from restrictions of this kind. In addition, our numerical analysis revealed the more
practical problem that – while maximizing the well-being in the whole federation – the mechanism
fails to guarantee utility gains for each single country under some parameter constellations. In
particular in a scenario with a large border country and low rates of onward migration the incentive
for the border country to participate diminishes.
Concluding from our results, the expected externality mechanism may – not only in theory – be
a suitable institutional setting to alleviate the problem of burden sharing when European soli-
19darity towards a small country at the external border such as Malta is to be achieved. Here, a
well-constructed EU enforcement fund based on the expected externality mechanism may work
successfully if the EU is capable (and granted the necessary powers) to run the fund in a way
underlined before. While the prospects for such an institution may look dense in the light of past
experience, the Lisbon Treaty allows for at least some optimism as applying the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure in the ﬁedd of border control is less restrictive than the previous unanimity rule.
Hence, it may be possible to ﬁnd a suﬃcient (double) majority to set up the necessary institutional
framework for introducing a mechanism-based EU enforcement fund.
In general the ﬁeld of mechanism design occurs to be a promising approach to continue the search
for institutional settings rendering the need for coercion in EU border management redundant.
Therefore future research in this area should be devoted to ﬁnding mechanisms, which guarantee
voluntary participation of all member countries in all conceivable settings, at the cost of sacriﬁcing
the condition of budget balance or providing a second-best level of enforcement. Additional insights
may be derived from investigating EU immigration policy in its entirety, including the existence of
several diﬀerently populous border countries and the inclusion of third countries like Morocco, Libya
or Mali, thereby accounting for recent developments in shifting border controls to extraterritorial
places.
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228 Appendix
8.1 Proof of proposition 1
The number of illegal immigrants in the federation, M, depends on an exogenously given migration
pressure to the federation, ¯ M, and the total eﬀort in border enforcement, E, along the external
border
M = M( ¯ M,E) (1)
with ∂M
∂E < 0. Recognizing the possibility of onward migration we specify the number of illegal
immigrants in each country by
M1 = (1 − α − β)M (2)
M2 = αM (3)
M3 = βM (4)
such that a share α of all illegal migrants moves on to country 2 and a share β moves to country 3.
The remaining share (1−α−β) of immigrants stays in country 1. Preferences in each country are
parametrized by a type parameter ti, specifying a high or a low impact of immigration on national
utility (see below). For simplicity this type parameter can only take on the values 0 and 1. The
utility function is given by
Ui = yi − Hi(Mi,ti) − ci(E) + mi + xi(ti). (5)
where the utility level Ui in each of the countries is determined by the output yi = Fi(Li,Mi) of
a production process which utilizes legal (Li) and illegal labor, the valuation function Hi(Mi,t)
which depends on the number of illegal migrants and the type parameter, the cost share of border
enforcement ci(E), the exogenously given endowment with money mi, and side payments xi which
are speciﬁed by the mechanism and also depend on the type parameter. Further, the form of the
valuation function is speciﬁed as follows:
Hi(Mi,t) = M2
i − tiMi (6)
Note the eﬀect of ti on the valuation function. Obviously, a parameter value of ti = h = 0 means
that the country has no positive eﬀect of immigration on Hi and therefore the negative impact
of illegal immigration on total utility is more pronounced than in the case of ti = l = 1. When
choosing the optimal enforcement level, a fully informed benevolent planner maximizes the sum of
utilities in all countries, that is
max
E
U = U1 + U2 + U3 (7)
23Diﬀerentiating with respect to E yiels the ﬁrst order condition which implicitly speciﬁes the optimal
level of border enforcement E∗:
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The left hand side denotes the marginal beneﬁt and the right hand side the marginal cost of
border enforcement for the whole federation. Note the dependence of the marginal beneﬁt on the
type parameter ti. If ti = 0 the marginal costs of enforcement are lower and consequently a higher
level of enforcement is optimal.
8.2 Proof of proposition 2
The decentralized solution is characterized by the border country (country 1) uncoordinately choos-
ing the level of enforcement. Thereby it does not take into account possible spillover eﬀects of
onward migration on the interior countries. The government of border country 1 maximizes utility
U1 = y1(L1,M1) − H1(M1) − c(E) (9)
with respect to the enforcement eﬀort E. The ﬁrst order condition for E is given by
(1 − α − β)22M
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When comparing the condition for the decentrally chosen level in (10) with the condition for
the federation’s welfare optimum in (8) we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between both decision rules is
ambiguous and depends on the preference parameters, the production function and the cost sharing
rule.
8.3 The expected externality mechanism
The payments xi for each player in the mechansim20 depend on the valuation of all other players
according to the following rule where e t−i denotes the truthful type report (in vector notation) of
all countries excluding i and EEe t−i gives the expected value over all realizations of the random
variable e t−i:






yj(E∗(ti,e t−i)) − Hj(E∗(ti,e t−i),e tj) − cj(E∗(ti,e t−i))


 + zi(t−i) (11)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side represents the expected utility of all other countries j 6= i
when country i announces its type to be ti and all other countries report truthfully. Therefore the
20See section 23.D in Mas-Colell et. al (1995).
24payment of country i hinges crucially on the so called ‘expected externality’ that it causes on all
other countries by reporting its own type ti. The second term zi(t−i) serves to balance the budget



















The logic behind the budget balancing term is that if each country contributes an equal share of
all other countries payments (in addition to the expectation term in (11)), then all payments will
sum up to zero.
8.4 Numerical example
The speciﬁcation of parameter values and the speciﬁed form of the diﬀerent functions used in
our numerical example are given below. The production and cost functions for each country are










where A is an eﬃciency parameter, δ gives the relative factor shares in the product and ρ determines
the elasticity of substitution between both production factors. For our example we choose A = 5,
δ = 0,9 and ρ = −0,5, such that legal labor makes up the main share in the production process
and the elasticity of substitution is relatively high.21 The cost function for each country is linear





where we arbitrarily set k = 10 as well as n = 3 since we want the direct costs of enforcement to
be shared equally among all countries.
21The elasticity of substiution is deﬁned as σ = 1
1+ρ.
258.4.1 Scenario 1: Small border country
Case 1: Migration pressure amounts to ¯ M = 1
t2 = 0 t2 = 1
t3 = 0 2,6 0,3
t3 = 1 0,6 0
Table 6: Welfare maximizing enforcement level for ¯ M = 1
Dececntally chosen enforcement level in the status quo: E = 0
Payments according to mechanism:
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h x1 = 239,9 x2 = −200,0 x3 = −39,9 x1 = 215,9 x2 = −152,1 x3 = −63,8
t3 = l x1 = 236,2 x2 = −203,6 x3 = −32,6 x1 = 212,3 x2 = −155,8 x3 = −56,5
Utility change through participation:
t2 = h t2 = l
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
t3 = h 0,3 6067,1 3967,2 25,3 3866,3 3876,4
t3 = l 35,2 5991,3 2174,9 60,6 3871,8 2215,4
Table 7: Payments and Utility diﬀerentials
Case 2: Migration pressure amounts to ¯ M = 10
t2 = 0 t2 = 1
t3 = 0 17,6 10,4
t3 = 1 11,6 6,9
Table 8: Welfare maximizing enforcement level for ¯ M = 10
Decentrally chosen enforcement level in the status quo: E = 0,9
26Payments according to mechanism:
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h x1 = 210,7 x2 = −174,4 x3 = −36,3 x1 = 184,3 x2 = −121,7 x3 = −62,7
t3 = l x1 = 205,8 x2 = −179,3 x3 = −26,5 x1 = 179,4 x2 = −126,6 x3 = −52,9
Utility change through participation:
t2 = h t2 = l
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
t3 = h −37,7 6414,4 4158,7 −11,1 4216,7 4080,7
t3 = l −0,7 6345,9 2376,5 26,7 4210,3 2400,5
Table 9: Payments and Utility diﬀerentials
8.4.2 Scenario 2: Large border country
Case 1: Migration pressure amounts to ¯ M = 1
t2 = 0 t2 = 1
t3 = 0 0,64 0,46
t3 = 1 0,53 0,38
Table 10: Welfare maximizing enforcement level for ¯ M = 1
Dececntally chosen enforcement level in the status quo: E = 0,61
Payments according to mechanism:
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h x1 = −182,0 x2 = 38,0 x3 = 143,9 x1 = −180,2 x2 = 34,5 x3 = 145,7
t3 = l x1 = −181,3 x2 = 38,7 x3 = 142,5 x1 = −179,5 x2 = 35,2 x3 = 144,3
Utility change through participation:
t2 = h t2 = l
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
t3 = h −177,8 36,1 141,8 −179,9 38,9 143,9
t3 = l −178,3 36,5 142,4 −184,7 43,7 148,8
Table 11: Payments and Utility diﬀerentials
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t2 = 0 t2 = 1
t3 = 0 12,8 11,7
t3 = 1 12,2 11,2
Table 12: Welfare maximizing enforcement level for ¯ M = 10
Dececntally chosen enforcement level in the status quo: E = 12,6
Payments according to mechanism:
t2 = h t2 = l
t3 = h x1 = −163,6 x2 = 28,4 x3 = 135,3 x1 = −160,8 x2 = 22,8 x3 = 138,1
t3 = l x1 = −162,3 x2 = 29,7 x3 = 132,6 x1 = −159,5 x2 = 24,1 x3 = 135,4
Utility change through participation:
t2 = h t2 = l
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
t3 = h −78,6 −14,0 92,8 −84,7 −12,0 98,7
t3 = l −81,4 −11,3 93,1 −90,7 −5,9 102,5
Table 13: Payments and Utility diﬀerentials
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